Who will be the next Fed chair?

On the campaign trail, now President Donald Trump made it pretty clear that he wanted Janet Yellen gone as the Chairperson of the Federal Reserve.  Now in a televised speech on Instagram last week (see here), President Trump offered the biggest clue to his intentions by dropping in the word "hopefully" in his wish that "they will do a fantastic job".  That "hopefully" is, in my view, a definite hint that change is on the way, as if he really had another Yellen term in mind he wouldn't have needed that "hopefully" word. As in so many areas with President Trump, he will break precedence if he doesn't reappoint Chairwoman Yellen, as every Fed chair in modern history who has completed a first term has been nominated for a second term.

So now that I believe it is fairly clear that he has signaled that he will replace her, the media has been looking at the candidates that the President has in mind, and focusing on the daily rumors that appear to emanate from the White House about who is in favor.  But the decision is not as easy as you might think, and for two reasons: i) the President has economic growth objectives that many conservative central bankers might see as unlikely and therefore may try and be more hawkish on monetary policy than otherwise would be the case; and ii) the end of the business cycle expansion is approaching, so the President would likely not want a Fed Chair that is inexperienced in the art of central banking.

This is probably the most important appointment that the President will make in his current term of office, as the likelihood of an economic downturn is extremely high, given that we are coming towards the end of the expansionary phase of the business cycle.  Whoever the next Fed chair is will very likely have to cope with a recession, and will have to position the Fed accordingly.

Therefore, in my view, given that Yellen has effectively dropped out of the race, there are really only 3 candidates left in the running. I will deal with each one separately below:

i) Jerome Powell.  Powell is currently on the Fed Board of Governors, so is no stranger to the Fed.  He was appointed to the Board in 2012 and is a card-carrying Republican as well as a multimillionaire having worked at the Carlyle Group.  He is moderate when it comes to monetary policy views but is not an economist, which may be seen by some as a weakness.  Nevertheless he clearly understands monetary policy well, but may not be the right guy for the job if the economy has another severe recession in the next 4 years.

ii) Kevin Warsh.  Warsh was first appointed an economic advisor at the White House in 2002, and then from 2006 to 2011 Warsh served as a Fed governor, but then resigned to join the Hoover Institution where he is currently employed.  He has been a frequent critic of the Fed, and there are already a website that has been established to lobby against his appointment (see here).  He is definitely seen as more of a hawk, and the consensus is that monetary policy would likely be on a tighter trajectory. He was trained as an economist, so that is a plus, but on the other hand many of his predictions when he was previously employed at the Fed (such as higher inflation if the Fed maintained QE) have not transpired, which doesn't give the markets much confidence in his judgment.

iii) Professor John Taylor, is the only distinguished economics professor among the  candidates. He is the author of the so-called "Taylor rule" which was an effort to use a rule-based setting of monetary policy for modelling purposes.  Taylor was at the US Treasury during the George W. Bush administration and served at the White House under Presidents Carter and Ford.  Through his comments on the maintenance of QE, the markets view him as somewhat hawkish, and the media believes that a Taylor appointment would "spook" the markets.

So what is the perception of the odds for each of these candidates?  The website "Predictit" (see here), has odds based on actual bets, and as of Nov 1st at 11.30am, the odds currently are:

So what is my assessment?  For me this comes in 3 parts - i) who will Trump choose and ii) who would be the best choice in my assessment; and iii) who would actually be best for stockmarket gains?  Let's deal with each in turn.

First, who do I think Trump will choose?  It seems that the President has changed his mind almost daily, so although the latest anonymous leak from the White House stating that Powell is the favorite (see here), I doubt this will be sustained until the announcement.  My belief is that Trump will want to go with an economist and someone who will shake things up at the Fed, as he will want to please his base and also impress other Republicans on Capitol Hill.  So my guess is that Trump will go with Taylor as long as he has Taylor's assurances that he will not enact a rules based policy as this would tend to raise rates faster than would be the case with the other candidates and might then derail the so-called "Trump rally" and spook the markets.  Of course if a Taylor appointment is made, then the markets might still be temporarily spooked until they can get reassurance during the Senate confirmation process.

Second, who do I think would be the best choice for the top job at the Fed?  I believe that continuity is important here, and that likely another Yellen term would actually be best for the country as a whole, as Yellen is already acting on "normalizing" Fed policy, but is doing so at a cautious rate that allows for economic growth to be sustained going forward.

Third, who would be the best choice for the markets?  I think the markets, as the polls show, would prefer Powell, as he possesses the element of continuity, but at the same time is a little more "light touch" on financial regulation than Yellen.

What is almost certain though is that whoever takes over at the Fed (unless it is a Yellen reappointment) will change Fed policy going forward, and that will undoubtedly impact the bond markets and perhaps the pace of interest rate hikes and the withdrawal of the QE stimulus, with its attendant effects on economic growth.  

Lions who have lost their roar? The Fed's monetary policy "normalization"

Anyone watching Janet Yellen's announcement back in September (see the statement here) that US interest rates were going to remain on hold (0-0.25% target range for the Fed funds rate back then) could have been mistaken that they were living in some kind of parallel universe.  Why would the Fed be concerned about “international developments” as a reason to hold off hiking rates?  Why did the Fed appear not to be worried about the possibility of not having any ammunition to fight future economic downturns, despite the fact that it is fairly well recognized that these downturns happen every 8-12 years?  Monetary policy has been in emergency mode for 9 years, and the Fed has refused to start to properly "normalize" monetary policy, despite the fact that the US is likely entering the late stages of the business cycle, and despite the fact that most of the US economic indicators had been showing fairly robust growth for quite a while.

Despite the fact that the US economy has been on a decent economic growth trajectory for several years now, the Fed appears to have been incredibly reluctant to raise rates, as though interest rate hikes would somehow cause a dramatic weakening of economic growth.  As one market commentator put it (and I paraphrase here), "the patient is still in the intensive care unit, although he's smiling, eating candies and watching TV".  In other words, by now, the patient should no longer be in intensive care, and perhaps not even hospitalized! 

So there was little economic justification then for the December rate hike announced last Wednesday (Dec 16^th) – the economic data releases are signaling an even weaker US manufacturing sector than we had in September, corporate profit growth has turned negative, and the housing sector has not taken off as might have been expected in such a low interest rate environment, particularly when the expectation of higher rates was fairly widespread.  So although most market commentators focused on the mechanics of the hike, and the new monetary policy tools that have been put in place, I really don’t think that that was the point of the hike – the Fed had signaled that it wanted a hike in 2015 and after delaying for all sorts of (what turned out to be spurious) reasons, it would have taken some pretty tortured reasoning not to raise rates in December after such a hike had been telegraphed for so long.

But that is the problem with the Fed policy right now – they have fallen behind the curve in terms of the normalization of monetary policy, and they do not appear to know how best to normalize policy in a world where monetary policy is now diverging (ECB and Bank of Japan loosening, Fed tightening) with the consequent negative effects on economic growth from deteriorating exports as the US dollar appreciates, and lackluster US economic growth. 

One aspect of the normalization is not being talked about much in the media – the fact that when loosening monetary policy the Fed lowered rates first and then enacted QE – but very little QE withdrawal has occurred and yet the Fed has raised rates again. Clearly the Fed has decided that interest rates are a better signal to markets in the event that there is a future economic downturn, but nevertheless the withdrawal of QE needs to occur before we have policy normalization.  I think it is fairly clear that full normalization will therefore not be achieved before the next economic downturn, given that the business cycle has a periodicity of about 8-10 years. 

In terms of the yield curve then, we are seeing flattening in the curve, as short rates have moved up, but long rates have moved up much less in the wake of the rate hike.  Any further rate hikes will further flatten the yield curve and may even invert it, which of course the Fed would likely want to avoid.  So there clearly is an expectation by the Fed that recent wage pressures will feed into higher levels of inflation – something that we have yet to observe.

In a way, the December rate hike publicly acknowledged that the Fed should have raised rates earlier, and that the Fed now realizes it needs to play “catch up” if certain sectors in the economy are not going to overheat, and to ensure that there is some ammunition available if we have an economic downturn in the next couple of years.  If anyone had any doubts about this, it could be deduced from the press release – the “dot plots” showing Fed expectations that rates will be raised four times in 2016 – this is clearly way out of line with Wall Street analyst expectations that only 2 rate hikes would occur.  Some analysts were puzzled that this was “hawkish” and not consistent with the “dovish” nature of Yellen’s announcement, but I think they missed the point here.

In an opinion piece published some time ago in the FT, Andrew Sentance (see here) made the point that the Fed was "falling behind the curve" in raising rates so as to return to a more normal monetary stance.  I would take that one step further - the Fed is now still seriously behind the curve in terms of rate normalization, as it should have started raising rates back in 2014 – we should be at around the 3rd rate hike in my opinion.

One interesting thing that I did hear last week was a comment by Jean-Claude Trichet that the US is in the late stage of its business cycle, but that the euro area and Japan are still mid-way through their business cycle.  But that implies that there is now not just divergence in terms of central bank monetary policy, but also “de-coupling” of business cycles between the US, Europe and Japan. This is an interesting conjecture, and I am now working on a future blog which explores this idea.

Next blog though will be my annual look at investment ideas for 2016!


Happy Christmas to all my blog readers!

Fed Policy: Do Two Wrongs Make A Right?

Deciding on monetary policy is not an easy task.  It requires an acute sense of economic wisdom in reading the signs that the economic data throws out, and also an actor's skill and sense of timing to ensure that the words are delivered in exactly the right form at the right time. The Fed has a monumental decision to take this week - whether to raise rates for the first time since July of 2006. That is over 9 years ago, and reflects how serious the last recession (or "great recession" as it's now called) was, not only in terms of it's initial depth, but also because of the way the recession was initiated (through the housing and financial sectors), through the consequent sluggish recovery.

But I think some in the media are under certain misconceptions about monetary policy.  Monetary policy is undoubtedly "abnormal" at the moment, with no real ability to lower rates if we go into another recession, and righting this "abnormality" is probably the strongest argument for lifting rates right now, as there doesn't appear to be any inflationary pressures on the horizon.  At least that is the official line I hear in the media, but more on this later.

Source: New York Times

The two strongest reasons I hear that the Fed shouldn't raise rates (see Larry Summers's FT blog outlining why he thinks the Fed should not raise rates now) are that US inflation rate (measured by CPI or PCE measures) is still under the Fed's 2% target, and that although the US labour market has recovered, the lower participation rate and stagnant wages still point to persistent weakness.  Add to this the new "emerging markets" Quantitative tightening argument made yesterday quite forcibly by Gavyn Davies in the FT (see here)

But when I read both Larry Summers's and Gavyn Davies's arguments, they seem rather weak to me, and for the following reasons:

i) "Normalization" is important.  As a central bank, the main instrument that the Fed has is interest rates. Using QE was an experiment, an experiment that other central banks are now using, but where there is considerable and continuing discussion regarding the effectiveness of this relatively new policy.  As we are now nearing the end of the current business cycle ( - business cycles typically have length of 4 to 10 years), the Fed needs to put some real teeth back into it's monetary policy instruments so that it has the ability to effectively ease if and when another sizable downturn occurs.

ii) Inflation.  Inflation is currently low basically because of the role of lower oil prices in bringing down input prices throughout most of the economy.  But once crude oil prices begin to rise again, which they inevitably will, the distortion of such a large fall in oil prices will work in the opposite direction - it will tend to bias inflation upwards rather than downwards.  Now although we do not know the full effect of lower oil prices on inflation, the Fed is using the measure of prices minus food and energy, which only takes out the direct effect of volatile energy prices, and not the further effect of energy prices as an input into the production of other goods and services.  So my point here is that inflation, even measured without food and energy prices, is still downwardly biased. A better indicator is probably wages, and they are increasing now at a 2.5% year over year rate (average weekly earnings on private nonfarm payrolls).  That implies that indeed we now are looking at some inflation in the system with the likelihood that even if current inflation levels are subdued, the actual future inflation rate is likely to incorporate these cost increases, and so inflation should be on an upward medium term trajectory.

Source: http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2015/09/13/will-emerging-economies-cause-global-quantitative-tightening/

iii) External factors.  The Fed does not set monetary policy on the basis of economic conditions external to the US.  Nevertheless, that has not stopped institutions like the IMF, the central bank of India, and other central banks from weighing in to urge the Fed not to raise rates in September.  Indeed, the sales of dollar reserves in the form of US government bonds has led to a tightening of interest rates which, as Gavyn Davies has pointed out in the FT, is an implicit tightening of policy in the medium term bond yields (around 10 years).  The figure on the right shows this trend, and indeed from a global perspective this trend is sufficiently large as to potentially swamp injections of liguidity through QE from both the ECB and the Bank of Japan. But I would argue that this is not relevant to the US - the US has to set monetary policy according to the economic and financial conditions in the US, and not elsewhere.  If the Fed starts to take these kinds of factors into account, then the Fed will no longer be setting US monetary policy - instead it will be setting global monetary policy, and this is not in it's mandate.

So to end this blog posting I want to make the case that 2 "wrongs" don't make a "right".  The Fed was wrong not to go in 2014 when it clearly had the chance to start the "normalization" process earlier in the growth phase of the business cycle.  For the reasons I have outlined above it would also be wrong not to increase rates now at the September meeting as well.  And yet there are still some commentators who suggest that it would be right not to raise rates this week.  My own assessment of the situation would be that the Fed would be falling seriously "behind the curve" on normalization of monetary policy, which could have extremely negative effects in 2016 or 2017 if and when the next recession arrives. Now the response to the points outlined here would undoubtedly be "but we could always do a QE4" - but no central bank really wants to extend the exceptional circumstances further unless absolutely necessary, and it would be a massive mistake if the Fed were to assume that the US economy could be effectively protected solely by a QE4. That would be like waging a battle with only air cover, and no infantry!

Why is the Fed ignoring a "differentiated taper"?

“I believe I am a sensible central banker and these are unusual times” - Janet Yellen, Testimony before Congress, February 11th, 2014.

In watching Janet Yellen's Testimony before Congress in February, and in reading Edward Luce's excellent commentary on the Fed in the FT (see here), it struck me that although Janet Yellen appears to be boxed in in terms of having an appropriate policy tool to get us out of the apparent slow growth US economy we now find ourselves in (see here for the latest Larry Summers opine about secular deflation), she is not.  And I'm not referring to "forward guidance" as the appropriate policy tool ( - a tool which I think has been ridiculous and based on flawed thinking).

As usual with these things, the answer is staring her right in the face.  Yes, the taper itself offers up the solution.  How?  Well in one of my previous blogs I outlined one exit strategy (see here) that I thought might be appropriate for the Fed to adopt. Although the Fed is currently reducing the purchases of both T Bills and mortgage backed securities (MBSs) at equal rates by $5bn each to $35bn of Treasuries and $30bn of MBSs (as most recently announced by the Fed on March 19th in the Fed's press release), this doesn't make too much sense to me in the current climate.

Why is this?  First, the Federal government Treasury interest rates really need to rise, and to be honest the Fed should be selling Treasuries right now, and certainly not buying anymore, given their recent (unwarranted) rally.

Second, the Federal government purchases were a way of stimulating the economy in two ways during the Federal government's economic stimulus a couple of years back - that is now not necessary as the stimulus is over and if anything the government deficit is rapidly shrinking. The chart below shows the US government budget deficit over the last decade, and we are now below the levels of deficits in terms of % of GDP that we experienced in the last major recessions, and more to the point, the trend line looks promising in terms of where we are going.

Third, with enough geopolitical risks in the rest of the world, I think it is safe to say that US Treasuries have enough demand support to weather a withdrawal of Fed support, so these purchases are really not optimal in terms of the objectives of monetary policy.

So I would argue that the Fed should heavily cut back on its purchases of US Treasuries while at the same time continuing to stimulate the housing market through purchases of MBSs.  I am calling this a "differentiated taper" as instead of just cutting purchases of both US Treasuries and MBSs, we can lower the overall amount of purchases while at the same time having a differential effect on the markets for each type of security.

Why is the concept of a "differentiated taper" important?  The reason why is that purchases of MBSs have an indirect impact on the housing market, as it lowers mortgage rates, thereby stimulating the construction of new housing.  Specifically, it should stimulate the employment of both blue and white collar workers in the construction industry, as more housing construction equals more hiring of architects, builders, contractors and subcontractors. What does purchases of government Treasury securities get us?  Lower borrowing rates for government, that's for sure, but not much else. Certainly there is no stimulus to the job market there right now as the government is cutting back on spending to move towards a balanced budget.

So if I were working at the Fed right now I would at the least be recommending a "differential taper" with an increase in purchases of MBSs of around $10bn, and a reduction in purchases of Treasuries by the Fed of around $20bn. This still balances out to a "taper" of $10bn, but it is differentiated, by stimulating the housing market, while allowing a longer term correction to the yield curve, a correction in my view that is now sorely needed.